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Austerity,	  slow	  growth,	  rising	  unemployment	  have	  had	  worrying	  effects	  on	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis.	  Fears	  of	  the	  Eurozone’s	  demise,	  although	  somewhat	  abated	  for	  the	  moment,	  continue	  to	  bring	  political	  and	  economic	  uncertainty	  to	  citizens	  and	  governments	  across	  the	  continent.	  One	  relatively	  unexplored	  consequence	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  it	  has	  engendered	  has	  been	  the	  new	  changes	  in	  mobility	  and	  citizenship	  acquisition	  trends	  within	  the	  EU.	  During	  periods	  of	  economic	  crisis,	  immigrants	  often	  find	  themselves	  pushed	  across	  borders	  by	  slow	  growth	  and	  high	  unemployment	  at	  home	  in	  search	  of	  better	  economic	  opportunities	  that	  pull	  them	  abroad.	  During	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  while	  governments	  have	  been	  restricting	  flows	  of	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  within	  Europe	  in	  general,	  many	  Europeans	  have	  taken	  advantage	  mobility	  rights	  within	  the	  Schengen	  area	  and	  have	  gone	  in	  search	  of	  better	  opportunities	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  EU.	  For	  many,	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  mobility	  are	  alluring.	  However,	  new	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  is	  increasing	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  citizenship	  acquisition	  as	  well,	  prompting	  new	  trends	  in	  naturalization	  across	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  countries.	  How	  has	  the	  crisis	  affected	  immigration	  and	  naturalization	  trends	  across	  Europe	  in	  its	  aftermath?	  	   This	  paper	  reveals	  how	  the	  lingering	  uncertainty	  and	  difficulties	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  have	  shaped	  immigrant	  settlement	  and	  naturalization	  patterns	  across	  Europe	  since	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  struck	  in	  2009.	  First,	  I	  argue	  that	  immigration	  flows	  within	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  the	  crisis	  generally	  follow	  the	  contours	  of	  standard	  economic	  models	  of	  migration.	  In	  the	  countries	  hardest	  hit	  by	  the	  crisis,	  we	  see	  significant	  decreases	  in	  immigration	  rates	  and	  large	  increases	  in	  emigration	  rates,	  while	  in	  the	  more	  economically	  stable	  core	  countries	  of	  the	  EU	  we	  observe	  the	  opposite.	  However,	  I	  also	  find	  that	  the	  crisis	  has	  
reduced	  even	  further	  the	  magnitude	  of	  non-­‐EU	  migration	  flows	  while	  reinforcing	  intra-­‐EU	  migration	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  mobility	  in	  the	  EU.	  Second,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  surprisingly,	  I	  show	  that	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  is	  driving	  a	  new	  trend	  of	  citizenship	  acquisition	  among	  Europeans.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  the	  widespread	  and	  much	  enjoyed	  freedom	  of	  mobility	  made	  possible	  by	  Schengen	  rules	  and	  European	  Union	  citizenship	  had	  depressed	  the	  motivation	  for	  Europeans	  to	  naturalize	  in	  other	  countries.	  However,	  because	  of	  economic	  uncertainties	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  its	  future	  members,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  expected	  signaling	  advantages	  conferred	  by	  host	  country	  citizenship,	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  is	  actually	  motivating	  Europeans	  from	  the	  most	  crisis-­‐stricken	  countries	  to	  naturalize	  in	  their	  respective	  host	  countries.	  The	  paper	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  First,	  I	  review	  extant	  theories	  of	  migration	  and	  naturalization	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	  Next,	  I	  present	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  immigration	  and	  naturalization	  trends	  in	  a	  post-­‐crisis	  Europe.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  immigration	  between	  the	  southern	  and	  peripheral	  countries	  of	  the	  EU	  –	  Greece,	  Italy,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  and	  Ireland	  (abbreviated	  GIPSIs)	  –	  and	  the	  ten	  countries	  of	  the	  northern	  ‘core’	  of	  the	  EU	  (abbreviated	  as	  NEU-­‐10).	  For	  sake	  of	  comparison,	  it	  also	  presents	  findings	  for	  the	  twelve	  post-­‐2004	  accession	  countries	  (A-­‐12)	  from	  Eastern	  Europe.1	  The	  second	  empirical	  section	  presents	  and	  discusses	  a	  simple	  regression	  analysis	  of	  the	  economic	  determinants	  of	  naturalization	  in	  several	  of	  the	  core	  countries	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  subsequent	  section	  summarizes	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  and	  concludes.	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  1	  The	  analysis	  omits	  Croatia,	  which	  joined	  the	  EU	  in	  2013.	  
There	  is	  a	  vast	  literature	  that	  theorizes	  the	  factors	  determining	  international	  migration	  (Borjas	  1989,	  1995;	  Massey	  et	  al.	  1993,	  1998;	  Cornelius	  and	  Rosenblum	  2005).	  Most	  traditional	  explanations	  of	  international	  migration,	  and	  ones	  directly	  applicable	  to	  intra-­‐EU	  migration,	  stem	  from	  neo-­‐classical	  economic	  models.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  geographic	  differences	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  and	  demand	  for	  labor	  largely	  drive	  migration	  flows	  (Harris	  and	  Todaro,	  1970;	  Todaro,	  1976).	  Low	  wages	  and	  high	  unemployment	  at	  home	  may	  ‘push’	  individuals	  across	  borders	  in	  search	  of	  higher	  wages	  and	  better	  employment	  opportunities	  that	  ‘pull’	  individuals	  abroad.	  Because	  of	  inherent	  wage	  differentials	  across	  countries	  and	  other	  market-­‐based	  factors	  forces	  at	  home,	  individual	  workers	  move	  to	  these	  more	  promising	  economic	  destinations	  (Massey	  et	  al.	  1993,	  1998).	  Similarly,	  according	  to	  the	  ‘new	  economics	  of	  migration’,	  families	  may	  also	  diversify	  their	  sources	  of	  income	  by	  assigning	  certain	  household	  members	  to	  activities	  in	  the	  local	  economy	  while	  sending	  others	  abroad,	  a	  decision	  that	  may	  maximize	  household	  income	  and	  reduce	  the	  risks	  of	  depending	  exclusively	  on	  the	  domestic	  economy	  (Stark	  and	  Bloom	  1985).	  	  These	  theories	  certainly	  explain	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  migratory	  flows	  within	  the	  EU	  in	  recent	  years	  (Alvarez-­‐Plata	  et	  al.	  2003,	  Kahanec	  and	  Zimmermann	  2010).	  The	  accession	  of	  the	  ten	  new	  Eastern	  European	  and	  Mediterranean	  member	  states	  in	  2004	  and	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria	  in	  2007	  are	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Accession	  meant	  extending	  to	  their	  citizens	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  throughout	  a	  new	  common	  labor	  market,	  a	  freedom	  that	  prompted	  widespread	  misgivings	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  mass	  influx	  of	  foreign	  workers	  for	  the	  reasons	  just	  specified.	  In	  2003,	  for	  example,	  the	  average	  wage	  in	  Latvia	  was	  just	  one	  eighth	  of	  the	  EU-­‐15	  average,	  and	  Polish	  unemployment	  rates	  stood	  at	  17.9	  percent	  compared	  to	  7.9	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  Indeed,	  because	  of	  these	  disparities	  between	  the	  Western	  
and	  Eastern	  EU	  member	  states,	  there	  were	  massive	  influxes	  of	  foreign	  workers	  seeking	  better	  economic	  opportunities	  in	  those	  countries	  that	  did	  open	  their	  labor	  markets	  immediately,	  especially	  into	  Great	  Britain.	  Between	  2003	  and	  2010,	  for	  example,	  the	  Polish-­‐born	  population	  of	  the	  UK	  increased	  from	  75,000	  to	  532,000	  (ONS	  2011).	  However,	  by	  2007,	  unemployment	  had	  decreased	  in	  most	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  due	  to	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  out-­‐migration	  to	  the	  West.	  While	  these	  economic	  push-­‐pull	  factors	  seem	  relatively	  straightforward	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  A-­‐12	  countries,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  whether	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  has	  unleashed	  similar	  dynamics.	  The	  answer	  requires	  consideration	  of	  four	  different	  populations	  within	  Europe.	  First,	  how	  has	  the	  crisis	  affected	  flows	  of	  non-­‐EU	  third	  country	  nationals	  (TCNs)?	  The	  Euro	  crisis	  has	  created	  palpable	  economic	  distress	  in	  a	  number	  of	  EU	  member	  states,	  especially	  the	  GIPSIs,	  but	  also	  in	  countries	  with	  economies	  highly	  linked	  to	  those	  suffering	  from	  the	  crisis.	  Downturns	  in	  GDP	  and	  rising	  unemployment	  should	  render	  Europe’s	  crisis-­‐stricken	  countries	  less	  attractive	  to	  all	  immigrants,	  but	  especially	  non-­‐EU	  immigrants.	  This	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  among	  immigrants	  in	  the	  GIPSIs,	  whom	  international	  flows	  have	  transformed	  during	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  into	  net	  immigration	  countries.	  For	  this	  reason	  I	  expect	  general	  reductions	  in	  flows	  of	  non-­‐EU	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  to	  those	  countries	  hardest-­‐hit	  by	  the	  crisis,	  but	  to	  varying	  degrees	  dependent	  on	  the	  economic	  context.	  	  Whether	  the	  crisis	  drives	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  toward	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  whose	  economies	  have	  remained	  relatively	  strong	  is	  less	  straightforward.	  Push	  factors	  in	  the	  European	  periphery	  should	  drive	  migrants	  northward	  in	  search	  of	  economic	  opportunity	  in	  more	  promising	  contexts,	  driving	  up	  immigration	  rates.	  However,	  the	  last	  several	  decades	  has	  witnessed	  the	  emergence	  of	  increasingly	  resilient	  anti-­‐immigrant	  parties	  and	  
Euroskeptic	  movements	  in	  Europe	  (Kitschelt	  1997;	  Givens	  2005;	  Mudde	  2008).	  These	  movements	  blame	  the	  EU	  and	  national	  elites	  for	  a	  host	  of	  problems,	  including	  the	  perceived	  negative	  effects	  of	  mass	  immigration	  and	  porous	  borders	  (Leonard	  and	  Torreblanca	  2014).	  While	  not	  a	  product	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  Euroskeptics	  and	  populist	  leaders	  are	  strengthened	  by	  the	  rapidly	  diminishing	  levels	  trust	  and	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  national	  parliaments	  among	  Europeans	  (Eurobarometer	  78;	  Mudde	  2013).	  Consequently,	  mainstream	  political	  parties	  and	  governments	  across	  the	  EU	  are	  under	  pressure	  from	  these	  parties	  to	  adopt	  tougher	  and	  more	  restrictive	  immigration	  policies	  (Howard	  2010).	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  expect	  that	  domestic	  forces	  in	  northern	  European	  countries	  to	  reduce	  the	  supply-­‐pull	  factors	  fostering	  immigration,	  and	  thus	  ultimately	  having	  a	  varied	  impact	  on	  non-­‐EU	  flows	  according	  to	  political	  context.	  Second,	  how	  has	  the	  crisis	  affected	  flows	  of	  EU	  citizens	  within	  the	  EU?	  Because	  European	  citizens	  do	  not	  need	  permits	  for	  immigration,	  residency,	  or	  employment	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  single	  European	  market,	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  less	  political	  barriers	  than	  third-­‐country	  nationals.	  Here	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  citizens	  from	  the	  GIPSIs,	  the	  A-­‐12,	  and	  returning	  first-­‐country	  nationals.	  Because	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  has	  exacerbated	  the	  economic	  disparities	  between	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  and	  the	  GIPSIs	  in	  ways	  that	  resemble	  earlier	  East-­‐West	  divisions,	  I	  expect	  similar	  increases	  into	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  from	  nationals	  of	  the	  five	  GIPSI	  countries,	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  flow	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  economic	  conditions	  of	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  country.	  I	  also	  expect	  reduced	  GIPSI	  flows	  into	  the	  A-­‐12	  and	  other	  GIPSI	  countries	  where	  economic	  opportunities	  may	  be	  fewer.	  Immigration	  from	  the	  A-­‐12	  should	  remain	  positive	  into	  the	  NEU-­‐10,	  but	  flows	  should	  diminish	  into	  countries	  whose	  economies	  have	  been	  more	  heavily	  impacted	  by	  the	  recession.	  Finally,	  first-­‐country	  nationals	  of	  the	  GIPSIs	  
should	  be	  least	  prone	  to	  return	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  because	  of	  vastly	  fewer	  opportunities	  at	  home	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  weather	  the	  crisis	  in	  more	  promising	  locales	  abroad.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  nationals	  of	  the	  A-­‐12	  should	  be	  highly	  prone	  to	  return	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin,	  since	  many	  had	  migrated	  on	  a	  temporary	  and	  cyclical	  basis	  to	  the	  GIPSIs	  in	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  2009	  downturn.	  Finally,	  I	  expect	  generally	  increased	  rates	  of	  return	  migration	  among	  nationals	  of	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  where	  their	  linguistic	  skills,	  qualifications,	  and	  citizenship	  give	  them	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  particularly	  as	  the	  destabilizing	  effects	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  persist.	  I	  summarize	  these	  predictions	  in	  Table	  1.	  TABLE	  1	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
Explaining	  Naturalization	  in	  Europe	  Approaches	  for	  explaining	  immigrant	  citizenship	  acquisition	  have	  drawn	  from	  a	  diverse	  literature	  but	  generally	  focus	  on	  individual	  or	  institutional	  level	  factors.	  One	  approach	  largely	  focuses	  on	  the	  individual-­‐level	  and	  socioeconomic	  characteristics	  of	  immigrants	  such	  as	  income,	  education,	  and	  length	  of	  time	  in	  residence	  (Portes	  and	  Curtis	  1987;	  Yang	  1994;	  Jones-­‐Correa	  2001;	  Dronkers	  and	  Vink	  2012).	  Generally,	  those	  immigrants	  with	  longer	  years	  in	  residence,	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  language	  ability,	  and	  better	  employment	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  naturalize	  (Yang	  1994;	  Vink,	  Prokic-­‐Breuer	  and	  Dronkers	  2013).	  A	  second	  theoretical	  approach	  focuses	  instead	  on	  the	  legal-­‐institutional	  diversity	  of	  citizenship	  policies	  that	  structure	  access	  to	  citizenship	  across	  countries.	  A	  state’s	  national	  model	  of	  citizenship	  or	  its	  particular	  citizenship	  policy	  configuration	  is	  widely	  thought	  to	  provide	  immigrants	  different	  opportunities	  and	  barriers	  to	  citizenship	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  incorporation	  (Brubaker	  1992;	  Joppke	  1999,	  2007;	  
Hansen	  and	  Weil	  2001;	  Koopmans	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Ersanilli	  and	  Koopmans	  2010).	  According	  to	  this	  perspective,	  varying	  naturalization	  rates	  and	  integration	  outcomes	  should	  depend	  largely	  on	  the	  relative	  restrictiveness	  of	  a	  receiving	  country’s	  citizenship	  regime,	  whether	  citizenship	  acquisition	  is	  based	  on	  jus	  sanguinis	  or	  jus	  soli,	  or	  whether	  a	  country’s	  self-­‐conception	  is	  more	  assimilationist,	  ethnocultural,	  or	  multicultural	  in	  orientation.	  Citizenship	  policies	  vary	  significantly	  in	  Europe	  according	  to	  national	  self-­‐conception	  of	  belonging	  or	  their	  relative	  level	  of	  inclusiveness	  and	  accessibility,	  such	  as	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
jus	  sanguinis	  or	  jus	  soli	  provisions	  or	  acceptance	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  (Brubaker	  1992;	  Howard	  2009,	  2010;	  Janoski,	  2010;	  Vink	  and	  De	  Groot	  2010;	  Bauböck	  2010).	  Several	  scholars	  have	  recently	  found	  that	  more	  open	  and	  accessible	  citizenship	  policies	  –	  especially	  the	  acceptance	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  -­‐	  facilitate	  naturalization	  among	  immigrants	  (Jones-­‐Correa	  2001;	  Dronkers	  and	  Vink	  2012;	  Vink,	  Prokic-­‐Breuer,	  and	  Dronkers	  2013).	  Other	  variables	  beyond	  individual	  characteristics	  and	  institutional	  settings	  have	  received	  relatively	  less	  attention.	  Some	  have	  examined	  country	  of	  origin	  factors	  that	  might	  determine	  immigrant	  proclivities	  toward	  naturalization,	  such	  as	  a	  country’s	  cultural	  affinity	  with	  immigrants’	  countries	  of	  origin,	  a	  legacy	  of	  colonialism,	  or	  continuing	  ties	  between	  sending	  and	  receiving	  countries	  (Yang	  1994;	  Bueker	  2005;	  Chiswick	  and	  Miller	  2009,	  Vink	  2013).	  Others	  have	  examined	  socioeconomic	  context	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  citizenship	  acquisition	  but	  have	  found	  mixed	  empirical	  support.	  Dronkers	  and	  Vink	  (2012),	  for	  example,	  test	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  receiving	  country	  as	  a	  ‘pull	  factor’	  affecting	  naturalization	  but	  find	  it	  has	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  citizenship	  acquisition,	  while	  Vink,	  Prokic-­‐Breuer,	  and	  Dronkers	  (2013)	  conversely	  find	  that	  employment	  status	  matters	  for	  naturalization,	  but	  only	  for	  immigrants	  from	  less	  developed	  countries.	  Janoski	  (2010)	  
includes	  economic	  variables	  in	  his	  study	  of	  naturalization	  rates	  in	  Europe,	  but	  they	  function	  only	  as	  controls	  and	  have	  no	  substantive	  effects	  on	  naturalization	  in	  his	  analysis.	  .	   This	  paper	  contends	  that	  the	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  plays	  a	  significant	  and	  overlooked	  role	  in	  determining	  recent	  citizenship	  acquisition	  trends	  in	  Europe.	  As	  Yang	  (1994)	  notes,	  the	  “costs,	  benefits	  and	  meaning	  of	  naturalization	  are	  the	  most	  immediate	  considerations	  in	  immigrants'	  decisions	  to	  naturalize”	  (451).	  Although	  citizenship	  may	  confer	  a	  range	  of	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  benefits	  to	  immigrants,	  the	  economic	  motivation	  to	  acquire	  citizenship	  is	  directly	  applicable	  to	  this	  analysis.	  Simply	  stated,	  rational	  immigrants	  may	  perceive	  that	  naturalization	  confers	  a	  ‘citizenship	  premium’	  in	  a	  host	  country	  that	  non-­‐naturalized	  immigrants	  do	  not	  receive.	  If	  immigrants	  perceive	  that	  citizens	  earn	  more,	  perform	  better,	  or	  are	  more	  upwardly	  mobile	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  than	  non-­‐citizens,	  the	  economically	  motivated	  immigrant	  may	  opt	  for	  naturalization	  to	  earn	  this	  potential	  premium.	  The	  premium	  may	  take	  any	  number	  of	  forms:	  reduced	  hiring	  costs	  for	  citizens,	  more	  access	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  employment	  or	  educational	  opportunities	  reserved	  for	  citizens,	  or	  less	  potential	  job	  discrimination	  based	  on	  citizenship	  status.	  It	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  device	  that	  naturalized	  immigrants	  may	  use	  to	  signal	  a	  level	  of	  integration,	  investment	  in	  a	  country,	  and	  reliability	  to	  employers	  who	  may	  otherwise	  question	  an	  applicant’s	  commitment	  to	  stay	  in	  a	  country.	  It	  could	  also	  give	  naturalized	  immigrants	  access	  to	  better	  wages	  over	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  housing	  and	  credit	  (DeVoretz	  2008;	  OECD	  2011,	  17-­‐18).	  Although	  few	  political	  scientists	  have	  examined	  the	  economics	  of	  naturalization,	  a	  number	  of	  economists	  have	  explored	  this	  citizenship	  premium	  in	  both	  the	  North	  American	  and	  European	  context	  (Bevelander	  2000;	  Bratsberg	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Pivnenko	  and	  DeVoretz	  
2004;	  DeVoretz	  2008;	  Bevelander	  and	  Veenman	  2008;	  OECD	  2011).	  However,	  the	  evidence	  is	  so	  far	  mixed.	  Bratsberg	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  find	  that	  the	  wage	  premium	  associated	  with	  naturalization	  is	  greater	  for	  immigrants	  from	  poorer	  countries,	  while	  DeVoretz	  and	  Pivnenko	  (2004)	  find	  in	  the	  Canadian	  case	  that	  acquiring	  citizenship	  increased	  the	  naturalized	  immigrant’s	  earnings.	  Fougère	  and	  Safi	  (2006)	  analyze	  longitudinal	  data	  and	  uncover	  a	  large	  citizenship	  premium	  earned	  with	  naturalization	  in	  France,	  particularly	  for	  economically	  disadvantaged	  immigrants.	  However,	  Bevelander	  (2000)	  finds	  that	  citizenship	  acquisition	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  labor	  market	  participation	  after	  naturalization	  in	  Sweden.	  In	  another	  study	  of	  immigrants	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Bevelander	  and	  Veenman	  (2008)	  conclude	  that	  naturalized	  immigrants	  earn	  more	  generally	  than	  non-­‐naturalized	  immigrants	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  but	  the	  inclusion	  of	  other	  demographic	  and	  labor	  market	  variables	  tend	  to	  wash	  out	  its	  statistical	  effect.	  	  	  	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  has	  increased	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  naturalization	  for	  the	  highly	  mobile	  immigrants	  within	  the	  EU	  today.	  First,	  because	  so	  many	  countries	  continue	  to	  suffer	  from	  low	  growth,	  high	  unemployment,	  and	  difficult	  austerity	  conditions,	  competition	  for	  stable	  employment	  and	  upwardly	  mobile	  jobs	  across	  the	  continent	  is	  fierce.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  significant	  citizenship	  premium	  may	  accrue	  to	  economic	  immigrants	  who	  naturalize	  in	  their	  country	  of	  residence.	  If	  the	  incentive	  is	  to	  make	  oneself	  as	  attractive	  to	  employers	  as	  possible,	  one	  means	  to	  do	  so	  is	  to	  acquire	  citizenship.	  Second,	  Europeans	  over	  the	  last	  six	  years	  have	  heard	  countless	  reports	  about	  the	  precarious	  future	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  speculations	  about	  a	  possible	  “Grexit”	  or	  other	  club	  departures,	  and	  even	  exaggerated	  fears	  
“that	  the	  euro	  crisis	  may	  end	  up	  destroying	  the	  European	  Union.”2	  In	  the	  context	  of	  such	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  future	  of	  Europe	  and	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  belong	  in	  the	  future,	  immigrants	  may	  perceive	  naturalization	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  insurance	  should	  one’s	  country	  of	  origin	  eventually	  leave	  the	  club.	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  therefore	  hypothesize	  that	  immigrant	  demand	  for	  citizenship	  should	  increase	  in	  relatively	  more	  economically	  stable	  and	  prosperous	  countries,	  and	  increase	  if	  they	  have	  migrated	  from	  relatively	  less	  economically	  stable	  ones.	  Within	  the	  EU,	  this	  means	  that	  naturalization	  rates	  should	  increase	  among	  GIPSI	  or	  A12	  nationals	  as	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  their	  country	  of	  settlement	  improves,	  or	  if	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  their	  country/region	  of	  origin	  deteriorates	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Euro	  Crisis.	  	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Effects	  of	  the	  Euro	  Crisis	  on	  Migration	  and	  Naturalization	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  immigration	  and	  naturalization	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  proceeds	  in	  a	  number	  of	  steps.	  First,	  I	  compare	  immigration	  trends	  in	  the	  EU	  before	  and	  after	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  2009.	  Then	  I	  offer	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  longer-­‐term	  analysis	  of	  immigration	  trends	  within	  a	  handful	  of	  NEU-­‐10	  and	  GIPSI	  countries.	  Finally,	  I	  conduct	  a	  series	  of	  regressions	  to	  test	  my	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  economic	  causes	  of	  naturalization.	  To	  compare	  how	  immigration	  trends	  have	  changed	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  I	  collected	  data	  on	  migration	  flows,	  stocks	  of	  foreign	  population,	  and	  citizenship	  acquisitions	  for	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐27	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  (just	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis)	  and	  again	  in	  2012	  and	  2013,	  the	  most	  recent	  years	  for	  which	  data	  was	  available.	  However,	  in	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order	  to	  assess	  these	  trends	  over	  a	  longer-­‐term	  among	  different	  immigrant	  populations,	  however,	  I	  gathered	  additional	  data	  according	  to	  respective	  nationality	  status	  for	  the	  years	  2002	  to	  2013.	  The	  previous	  nationality	  categories	  relevant	  for	  this	  study	  were	  those	  from	  the	  five	  GIPSI	  countries,	  the	  post-­‐2004	  A-­‐12	  countries	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  more	  generally	  EU	  and	  non-­‐EU	  immigrants,	  as	  these	  categories	  should	  summarize	  the	  most	  significant	  immigration	  groups	  during	  the	  relevant	  period.	  Most	  data	  comes	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  national	  statistical	  offices,	  Eurostat	  (2014),	  and	  the	  OECD’s	  (2014)	  
International	  Migration	  Database.	  While	  some	  sources	  were	  more	  or	  less	  incomplete	  for	  certain	  selected	  countries,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  the	  significant	  comparability	  among	  them	  corroborated	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  data	  gathered.	  Unfortunately,	  for	  many	  of	  the	  EU-­‐27	  countries	  this	  more	  extensive	  data	  is	  not	  readily	  available,	  if	  it	  exists	  at	  all.	  Thus	  to	  assess	  these	  longer-­‐term	  trends	  for	  these	  different	  immigrant	  categories,	  I	  restrict	  my	  more	  extensive	  analysis	  to	  a	  more	  limited	  number	  of	  Western	  European	  countries.	  	  Because	  most	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  immigration	  during	  the	  crisis	  occurs	  within	  the	  NEU-­‐10,	  we	  begin	  by	  examining	  aggregate	  flows	  into	  select	  northern	  European	  countries.3	  Figures	  1	  and	  2	  display	  aggregated	  immigration	  rates	  and	  percent	  of	  respective	  total	  immigration	  flows	  across	  these	  countries	  from	  2003	  to	  2013.	  Although	  these	  elide	  national-­‐level	  trends,	  several	  larger	  trends	  come	  into	  focus.	  First,	  in	  the	  years	  since	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  began	  in	  2009,	  immigration	  rates	  across	  all	  EU	  categories	  have	  increased.	  The	  highest	  and	  most	  pronounced	  immigration	  rate	  is	  that	  of	  A-­‐12	  nationals,	  which	  dipped	  sharply	  in	  2009	  but	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  net	  increase	  of	  18.5	  percent	  over	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  level	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  include	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  without	  France,	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  data	  availability.	  I	  do,	  however,	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  Norway	  in	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  figures	  as	  a	  non-­‐EU	  country	  that	  is	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  to	  the	  same	  labor	  mobility	  rules	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Schengen	  zone.	  Including	  Norway	  reveals	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  are	  not	  restricted	  exclusively	  to	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  Eurozone.	  
in	  2008.	  A-­‐12	  nationals	  now	  comprise	  roughly	  a	  third	  of	  all	  immigrants	  migrating	  to	  these	  northern	  European	  countries.	  In	  comparison,	  the	  GIPSI	  immigration	  rate	  is	  the	  lowest	  of	  the	  categories,	  but	  after	  a	  long	  period	  of	  stagnation	  experienced	  a	  137	  percent	  increase	  between	  2008	  and	  2013,	  the	  largest	  increase	  of	  all	  the	  categories.	  The	  GIPSI	  rate	  even	  surpassed	  the	  TCN	  immigration	  rate	  in	  2013,	  which	  is	  striking	  considering	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  overall	  magnitudes	  of	  the	  two	  categories.	  In	  terms	  of	  share	  of	  overall	  flows,	  GIPSI	  nationals	  have	  roughly	  doubled	  their	  share	  of	  overall	  foreign	  flows	  to	  the	  region	  to	  11	  percent.	  Third-­‐country	  nationals	  and	  returning	  nationals,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  overall	  been	  stagnant	  if	  not	  decreasing	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  Figure	  2	  also	  reveals	  that	  immigration	  from	  non-­‐EU	  countries	  continues	  to	  decline	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  flows	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  down	  from	  roughly	  half	  of	  all	  immigration	  in	  2008.	  If	  one	  combines	  A-­‐12	  and	  GIPSI	  flows,	  they	  represent	  nearly	  half	  of	  all	  foreign	  flows	  into	  the	  region	  and	  even	  exceed	  total	  TCN	  flows.	  Table	  2	  presents	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  immigration	  rates	  for	  the	  key	  immigrant	  flow	  categories	  between	  2008	  and	  2012.	  Looking	  first	  at	  the	  TCN	  category,	  we	  find	  general	  confirmation	  of	  Hypotheses	  1a,	  b,	  and	  c.	  Among	  the	  NEU-­‐10,	  TCN	  flows	  have	  decreased	  sharply	  in	  Belgium,	  Finland,	  Sweden,	  and	  the	  UK,	  while	  they	  have	  increased	  most	  strongly	  in	  Austria,	  Germany,	  and	  Luxembourg.	  The	  positive	  results	  generally	  conform	  to	  what	  one	  would	  expect:	  increased	  flows	  to	  countries	  that	  have	  managed	  relatively	  well	  during	  the	  crisis.	  The	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  Belgium	  is	  somewhat	  surprising,	  but	  given	  the	  geography	  of	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	  and	  recent	  attempts	  to	  restrict	  migration	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  other	  results	  are	  generally	  as	  predicted.	  TCN	  flows	  into	  the	  GIPSIs	  likewise	  conform	  to	  expectations:	  across	  the	  board,	  TCN	  immigration	  rates	  in	  Greece,	  Italy,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  
and	  Ireland	  have	  all	  fallen,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  members.	  Similarly,	  TCN	  rates	  into	  the	  A-­‐12	  have	  likewise	  decreased	  overall,	  albeit	  with	  some	  slight	  increases	  in	  Cyprus	  and	  Estonia.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  immigration	  rates	  for	  EU	  nationals.	  Among	  GIPSI	  nationals,	  we	  see	  increases	  in	  rates	  across	  the	  entire	  NEU-­‐10,	  but	  wide	  variation	  among	  them	  as	  predicted	  in	  Hypothesis	  2a.	  They	  are	  clearly	  drawn	  to	  the	  economically	  stable	  countries	  like	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  and	  Germany.	  GIPSI	  nationals,	  however,	  have	  the	  least	  incentive	  to	  migrate	  back	  home	  or	  into	  the	  A-­‐12	  countries,	  as	  postulated	  by	  Hypotheses	  2b	  and	  4b,	  where	  the	  lack	  of	  economic	  opportunities	  poses	  a	  strong	  disincentive	  for	  migration.	  As	  expected	  in	  Hypotheses	  3a-­‐c,	  the	  nationals	  of	  the	  A-­‐12	  also	  show	  much	  less	  interest	  in	  migrating	  to	  the	  GIPSI	  countries	  like	  Italy	  and	  Spain	  where	  earlier	  A-­‐12	  immigrants	  had	  found	  employment,	  and	  collectively	  have	  the	  highest	  average	  rate	  of	  return	  across	  the	  categories.	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  country-­‐level	  variation.	  Hungarians,	  Lithuanians,	  Poles,	  and	  Romanians	  seem	  most	  prone	  to	  return,	  while	  Czechs	  and	  Estonians	  are	  returning	  home	  less	  in	  2012	  than	  compared	  to	  before	  the	  crisis.	  Although	  A-­‐12	  immigration	  rates	  to	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  have	  dropped	  most	  dramatically	  compared	  to	  before	  the	  crisis,	  many	  A-­‐12	  nationals	  may	  be	  selectively	  migrating	  to	  core	  countries	  within	  the	  NEU-­‐10,	  such	  as	  Austria	  and	  Germany,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  varying	  immigration	  rates	  in	  the	  upper-­‐center	  column	  of	  Table	  2.	  Thus	  Hypotheses	  3c	  and	  4c	  are	  only	  partially	  confirmed.	  Finally,	  nationals	  of	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  only	  show	  mixed	  rates	  of	  return	  migration	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis.	  In	  fact,	  only	  four	  of	  the	  ten	  actually	  increased	  their	  rates	  of	  return	  between	  the	  two	  periods,	  while	  in	  the	  other	  six,	  fewer	  immigrants	  were	  returning	  in	  2012	  than	  in	  2008.	  This	  may	  reflect	  the	  possibility	  
that	  most	  returning	  nationals	  did	  so	  in	  the	  intervening	  years.	  Nonetheless,	  we	  reject	  Hypothesis	  4a	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  evidence.	  TABLE	  2	  ABOUT	  HERE	  To	  capture	  how	  the	  economics	  of	  the	  crisis	  have	  affected	  these	  migration	  flows	  across	  Europe,	  in	  Figure	  3	  I	  have	  graphed	  percent	  changes	  in	  immigration	  rates	  for	  flow	  categories	  across	  nine	  NEU-­‐10	  countries	  and	  three	  GIPSI	  countries	  in	  order	  of	  the	  percent	  change	  in	  their	  post-­‐crisis	  unemployment	  rate.	  As	  we	  expect,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  change	  in	  immigration	  and	  unemployment	  rates	  in	  a	  country	  (Pearson’s	  correlation	  for	  total	  immigration	  is	  -­‐0.66,	  p=0.02).	  In	  other	  words,	  countries	  that	  experience	  much	  smaller	  changes	  in	  unemployment	  at	  home	  have	  much	  higher	  changes	  in	  immigration	  flows.	  This	  suggests	  that	  labor	  market	  may	  be	  a	  strong	  pull	  factor	  for	  certain	  flows.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  changes	  in	  unemployment	  on	  flows	  varies	  according	  to	  immigration	  population.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  correlation	  between	  change	  in	  GIPSI	  rate	  and	  unemployment	  is	  -­‐0.73	  (p=0.007),	  and	  between	  the	  A12	  rate	  and	  unemployment	  is	  -­‐0.64	  (p=0.03),	  suggesting	  that	  unemployment	  is	  contributing	  to	  these	  two	  movements	  across	  Europe.	  However,	  the	  correlation	  for	  TCNs	  and	  returning	  nationals	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  although	  they	  are	  negative	  as	  the	  figure	  captures.	  This	  suggests	  that	  TCNs	  are	  less	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  unemployment	  in	  their	  countries	  of	  settlement	  during	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  likely	  because	  of	  other	  push/pull	  factors	  occurring	  in	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  not	  captured	  here.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  nationals	  returning	  home	  are	  less	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  unemployment	  in	  their	  home	  countries,	  and	  their	  choice	  to	  return	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  other	  factors	  as	  well.	   FIGURE	  3	  ABOUT	  HERE	  
The	  figure	  does	  however	  reveal	  the	  widespread	  variation	  within	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  and	  between	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  and	  the	  GIPSIs.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  only	  two	  countries,	  Austria	  and	  Germany,	  saw	  significant	  increases	  in	  the	  immigration	  rates	  of	  all	  categories.	  They	  likewise	  are	  two	  of	  three	  countries	  that	  saw	  increased	  TCN	  rates	  and	  that	  did	  not	  experience	  an	  A-­‐12	  rate	  decrease	  over	  the	  period.	  They	  also	  attracted	  the	  highest	  GIPSI	  immigration	  rates	  as	  well.	  Germany’s	  GIPSI	  rate	  increased	  from	  4.1	  to	  10.25	  over	  the	  period,	  a	  150	  percent	  increase	  over	  its	  2008	  rate,	  and	  Austria’s	  from	  16	  to	  25.7	  GIPSI	  immigrants	  per	  100	  resident,	  an	  increase	  of	  60	  percent.	  This	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  countries	  are	  bearing	  the	  brunt	  of	  most	  intra-­‐EU	  migration	  today.	  While	  most	  other	  NEU-­‐10	  experienced	  net	  increases	  in	  GIPSI	  immigration	  rates	  over	  the	  period,	  nearly	  all	  saw	  decreased	  rates	  of	  immigration	  among	  all	  other	  categories,	  especially	  TCNs	  and	  A-­‐12	  nationals.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  both	  the	  diminishing	  comparative	  attraction	  of	  the	  EU	  for	  non-­‐EU	  labor	  migration	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  public	  pressures	  to	  restrict	  immigration	  flows	  generally.	  However,	  push	  factors	  in	  the	  GIPSI	  countries	  and	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  labor	  within	  the	  Schengen	  area	  may	  override	  any	  public	  pressures	  for	  greater	  restrictions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  immigration	  rates	  in	  Spain,	  Italy,	  and	  Ireland	  have	  more	  halved	  in	  magnitude,	  as	  other	  EU	  countries	  increasingly	  appear	  more	  attractive	  for	  potential	  migrants.	  	  	   The	  Euro	  crisis	  seems	  to	  affect	  immigration	  rates	  across	  Europe,	  but	  in	  different	  ways	  for	  different	  types	  of	  flow.	  Does	  it	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  naturalization	  rates	  across	  Europe	  as	  well?	  To	  test	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  immigrants	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  economic	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  EU	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  naturalize	  in	  more	  stable	  countries,	  I	  first	  graph	  percent	  changes	  in	  naturalization	  rates	  for	  flow	  categories	  across	  nine	  NEU-­‐10	  countries	  and	  two	  GIPSI	  countries	  in	  order	  of	  the	  percent	  change	  in	  their	  post-­‐crisis	  unemployment	  
rate,	  captured	  in	  Figure	  4.	  The	  relationship	  seems	  much	  less	  straightforward	  than	  between	  migration	  and	  unemployment,	  with	  a	  weak	  overall	  correlation	  of	  -­‐0.305	  (p=0.36).	  In	  fact,	  the	  relationship	  is	  only	  significant	  for	  naturalizations	  among	  GIPSI	  nationals	  (Pearson’s	  r=	  -­‐0.56,	  p=0.07),	  implying	  that	  the	  employment	  situation	  in	  the	  country	  of	  settlement	  may	  only	  be	  relevant	  for	  GIPSI	  nationals.	  Indeed,	  GIPSI	  naturalization	  rates	  did	  increase	  in	  eight	  of	  the	  nine	  NEU-­‐10	  countries,	  whereas	  TCN	  rates	  increased	  in	  six	  of	  the	  nine	  and	  A12	  rates	  in	  only	  four	  of	  the	  nine	  NEU-­‐10	  countries.	  However,	  the	  rates	  for	  TCNs,	  GIPSI,	  and	  A12	  nationals	  all	  increased	  curiously	  in	  Spain,	  despite	  a	  drastic	  13.5	  point	  increase	  in	  unemployment	  over	  the	  period.	   FIGURE	  4	  ABOUT	  HERE	  	   Of	  course,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  scholars	  have	  identified	  many	  other	  factors	  contribute	  to	  citizenship	  acquisitions	  among	  immigrants,	  so	  these	  correlations	  are	  only	  suggestive	  of	  a	  trend.	  To	  control	  for	  some	  of	  these	  other	  factors,	  I	  conduct	  a	  series	  of	  pooled	  OLS	  regressions	  using	  this	  data	  collected	  across	  12	  European	  countries	  over	  the	  period	  2000	  to	  2014	  (n=182).4	  To	  deal	  with	  potential	  heteroskedasticity	  and/or	  autocorrelation	  in	  the	  data,	  I	  employ	  panel	  corrected	  standard	  errors	  (PCSE)	  advocated	  by	  Beck	  and	  Katz	  (1995)	  for	  use	  with	  OLS.	  Below	  I	  describe	  how	  I	  operationalize	  the	  variables	  in	  my	  analysis.5	  	   The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  the	  naturalization	  rate.	  This	  was	  calculated	  as	  the	  number	  of	  naturalizations	  by	  a	  respective	  immigrant	  population	  within	  a	  country	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  countries	  are	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Due	  to	  the	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size,	  each	  model	  is	  limited	  in	  the	  number	  of	  variables	  it	  can	  statistically	  handle.	  5	  I	  employ	  pooled	  OLS	  as	  I	  have	  no	  theoretical	  reason	  to	  expect	  different	  countries	  or	  years	  to	  have	  effects	  on	  naturalization	  rates	  independent	  of	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  However,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  pooled	  OLS,	  I	  also	  run	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model	  and	  include	  it	  in	  the	  appendix.	  
a	  given	  year,	  divided	  by	  that	  respective	  immigrant	  population	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  that	  year,	  and	  multiplied	  by	  100.	  Calculating	  rates	  for	  different	  immigrant	  populations	  is	  critical	  here,	  because	  I	  expect	  the	  economic	  motivations	  to	  naturalization	  to	  only	  matter	  for	  immigrants	  coming	  from	  the	  most	  crisis-­‐stricken	  countries	  within	  the	  EU.	  I	  calculate	  respective	  naturalization	  rates	  for	  total	  immigrants,	  EU	  immigrants,	  A-­‐12	  nationals,	  GIPSI	  nationals,	  and	  third-­‐country	  nationals.	  My	  primary	  independent	  variables	  represent	  measures	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  context.	  First,	  I	  include	  unemployment	  and	  relative	  unemployment	  figures	  in	  each	  country-­‐year,	  for	  both	  the	  receiving	  and	  sending	  country/region	  of	  origin.	  I	  also	  calculate	  a	  weighted	  unemployment	  measure	  for	  the	  GIPSI	  countries	  that	  adjusts	  home	  country	  unemployment	  according	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  immigrant	  flow	  in	  that	  country-­‐year.	  Variables	  for	  Difference	  in	  Unemployment	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  captures	  the	  relative	  wealth	  gaps	  between	  sending	  and	  receiving	  countries,	  and	  EU	  Difference	  in	  Unemployment	  represents	  the	  unemployment	  level	  in	  a	  given	  country-­‐year	  relative	  to	  the	  EU	  average.	  Inflation-­‐adjusted	  GDP	  change	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  the	  acute	  effects	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  in	  the	  respective	  year.	  Variables	  that	  represent	  greater	  economic	  hardship	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  greater	  economic	  stability	  in	  the	  country	  of	  settlement,	  or	  greater	  differences	  in	  economic	  opportunity	  between	  sending	  and	  receiving	  countries,	  should	  increase	  naturalization	  rates.	  To	  capture	  the	  institutional	  context,	  I	  include	  values	  from	  a	  yet	  unpublished	  citizenship	  policy	  index	  that	  captures	  the	  relative	  costliness	  of	  citizenship	  across	  sixteen	  European	  countries	  and	  several	  decades	  (Graeber,	  n.d).	  The	  Integration	  Cost	  of	  Citizenship	  indicator	  (ICCI)	  codes	  citizenship	  policy	  according	  to	  eight	  different	  requirements,	  such	  as	  dual	  citizenship	  and	  duration	  of	  residence,	  and	  reflects	  the	  
institutional	  opportunity	  structure	  governing	  citizenship	  acquisition.	  Higher	  values	  expected	  to	  decrease	  naturalization	  rates	  and	  lower	  values	  to	  increase	  rates.	  Finally,	  I	  include	  controls	  for	  corresponding	  immigrant	  group	  inflows,	  percent	  of	  foreign	  population,	  and	  dummy	  variables	  for	  years	  of	  EU	  Enlargement,	  for	  the	  years	  of	  the	  Euro	  Crisis,	  and	  for	  ClubMed,	  representing	  the	  two	  GIPSI	  countries	  in	  the	  models.	  
Results	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  models	  for	  the	  naturalization	  rates	  among	  different	  immigrant	  populations	  are	  summarized	  in	  Tables	  3,	  4,	  and	  5.	  Model	  1	  in	  Table	  3	  captures	  the	  baseline	  model	  for	  all	  immigrants.	  Models	  2-­‐6	  add	  alternative	  specifications	  of	  economic	  variables	  described	  above	  as	  well	  as	  various	  controls.	  TABLE	  3	  ABOUT	  HERE	  In	  general,	  the	  economic	  hypothesis	  seems	  to	  find	  confirmation	  in	  the	  results.	  We	  see	  that	  Country.Unemployment	  in	  Model	  2	  and	  Relative.EU.Unemployment	  are	  both	  significant	  in	  their	  predicted	  directions.	  Higher	  country	  unemployment	  in	  the	  destination	  country	  seems	  to	  depress	  naturalization	  rates,	  while	  lower	  unemployment	  compared	  to	  the	  EU	  average	  seems	  to	  increase	  them.	  The	  dummy	  variable	  for	  Euro	  Crisis	  years	  in	  Model	  5	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ClubMed	  variable	  coded	  for	  Italy	  and	  Spain	  are	  both	  negative	  and	  significant,	  suggesting	  these	  years	  and	  these	  countries	  have	  an	  independent	  negative	  effect	  on	  naturalization.	  The	  political	  variable	  that	  captures	  the	  restrictiveness	  of	  citizenship	  policy	  is	  likewise	  signed	  correctly	  and	  is	  significant	  in	  all	  models.	  Only	  GDP	  Change	  in	  Model	  3	  is	  not	  significant.	  In	  Table	  4,	  which	  models	  naturalization	  rates	  among	  GIPSI	  nationals,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  variables	  for	  origin	  country	  economic	  conditions	  in	  Models	  2,	  3,	  and	  8	  are	  significant	  and	  
positive,	  suggesting	  that	  as	  unemployment	  rises	  at	  home,	  immigrants	  naturalize	  abroad.	  Conversely,	  Country.Unemployment	  in	  Model	  6	  is	  significant	  and	  negative,	  revealing	  that	  as	  unemployment	  rises	  in	  the	  country	  of	  settlement,	  naturalization	  rates	  decrease.	  Relative	  EU	  Unemployment	  in	  Model	  7	  is	  significant	  and	  positive,	  likewise	  suggesting	  that	  as	  a	  country’s	  unemployment	  situation	  relative	  to	  the	  EU	  average	  improves,	  it	  should	  expect	  higher	  naturalization	  rates	  among	  GIPSI	  nationals.	  Finally,	  in	  Table	  5,	  which	  models	  naturalization	  rates	  among	  A12	  nationals,	  we	  observe	  broadly	  similar	  dynamics.	  Adding	  economic	  variables	  in	  Models	  2-­‐10	  improves	  the	  fit	  over	  the	  base	  model	  and	  all	  remain	  significant	  across	  different	  specifications.	  	  
Conclusion	  This	  paper	  has	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  on	  mobility	  and	  citizenship	  acquisition	  trends	  across	  the	  EU.	  In	  terms	  of	  immigration,	  my	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  immigration	  varies	  rather	  dramatically	  across	  the	  EU,	  but	  this	  variation	  seems	  to	  generally	  follow	  rather	  predictable	  patterns	  of	  comparative	  economic	  attractiveness	  across	  countries	  that	  standard	  economic	  models	  of	  migration	  would	  predict.	  While	  immigration	  rates	  across	  the	  countries	  analyzed	  have	  increased	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  2009,	  this	  is	  primarily	  driven	  by	  increases	  in	  immigration	  from	  the	  A12	  and	  GIPSI	  countries	  and	  relative	  stagnation	  in	  the	  flows	  among	  TCNs.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  crisis	  continues,	  we	  observe	  greater	  movement	  from	  GIPSI	  nationals	  into	  the	  economic	  safe	  havens	  of	  the	  north,	  while	  A12	  migration	  seems	  divided	  between	  returning	  home	  and	  migrating	  to	  the	  Germany	  and	  other	  economic	  core	  countries.	  Thus	  in	  the	  countries	  hardest	  hit	  by	  the	  crisis,	  we	  see	  significant	  decreases	  in	  immigration	  rates	  and	  large	  increases	  in	  emigration	  rates,	  while	  in	  the	  more	  economically	  stable	  core	  countries	  of	  the	  EU	  we	  observe	  the	  opposite.	  	  
Second,	  and	  less	  predictable	  by	  previous	  theorizing,	  I	  show	  that	  the	  Euro	  crisis	  has	  begun	  driving	  a	  new	  trend	  of	  citizenship	  acquisition	  among	  Europeans.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Euro	  crisis,	  Europeans	  seemed	  much	  more	  disinclined	  to	  acquire	  the	  citizenship	  of	  another	  EU	  country,	  due	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  mobility	  made	  possible	  by	  Schengen	  rules	  and	  European	  Union	  citizenship.	  However,	  my	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  lingering	  economic	  uncertainties	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  continued	  economic	  malaise	  in	  the	  GIPSI	  countries,	  and	  persistent	  economic	  stability	  in	  the	  NEU-­‐10	  countries	  has	  apparently	  reaffirmed	  the	  possible	  value	  of	  citizenship	  acquisition	  in	  Europe.	  The	  fact	  that	  more	  EU	  immigrants	  are	  naturalizing	  in	  other	  EU	  countries	  certainly	  seems	  to	  counter	  the	  perceived	  diminishing	  value	  of	  citizenship	  in	  post-­‐national	  Europe	  that	  many	  scholars	  have	  discussed	  in	  recent	  years	  (Hansen	  2009;	  Joppke	  2010).	  As	  my	  exploration	  revealed,	  demand	  for	  citizenship	  has	  apparently	  increased	  among	  nationals	  migrating	  from	  crisis-­‐stricken	  countries	  and	  regions	  into	  the	  relatively	  more	  economically	  stable	  ones.	  While	  additional	  research	  will	  be	  required	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  proposed	  causal	  mechanism	  is	  at	  work	  or	  not,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  future	  of	  Europe,	  immigrants	  indeed	  seem	  to	  increasingly	  perceive	  naturalization	  in	  certain	  core	  EU	  countries	  as	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  advantage.	  	   	  






















	  	  	  	  
	  	   	  
Country TCN GIPSI A12 Nationals All5EU5
Citizens
Total5Foreign
NEU<105Average2 <1.33 4.15 <10.37 <0.16 <0.90 <0.81
!!!!!Austria 1.40 9.66 4.43 0.82 0.74 1.83
!!!!!Belgium 87.89 2.40 814.97 82.03 80.89 82.93
!!!!!Denmark 81.22 5.58 817.69 80.26 88.70 82.87
!!!!!Finland 83.57 1.90 0.17 80.02 80.35 82.26
!!!!!France 0.36 80.19 1.47 0.75
!!!!!Germany 2.51 6.15 12.85 0.10 9.61 5.43
!!!!!Luxembourg 2.41 0.82 827.31 0.08 80.02 0.30
!!!!!Netherlands 0.19 4.01 826.96 80.27 82.00 80.30
!!!!!Sweden 84.46 4.12 815.03 0.26 83.36 83.56
!!!!!United!Kingdom 83.05 2.75 88.78 80.12 85.53 84.47
GIPSI5Average2 <3.81 <2.12 <10.28 <0.44 <5.48 <4.73
!!!!!Greece 81.37 0.20 81.32
!!!!!Ireland 80.32 80.18 87.50 81.55 85.40 83.93
!!!!!Italy 84.92 80.16 817.17 80.15 815.60 87.81
!!!!!Portugal 83.37 80.02 82.13 83.30
!!!!!Spain 89.07 86.03 86.17 80.03 84.45 87.28
A<125Average2 <13.52 <7.54 0.00 0.82 <11.04 <11.31
!!!!!Bulgaria 0.06 0.53
!!!!!Cyprus 1.71 0.21 1.44 1.53
!!!!!Czech!Republic 822.67 85.81 80.22 81.84 88.56 817.38
!!!!!Estonia 0.11 80.19 811.45 80.31
!!!!!Hungary 87.39 82.70 0.06 1.15 84.82 85.92
!!!!!Latvia
!!!!!Lithuania 80.58 3.83 13.76 1.62
!!!!!Malta 82.05 1.05 86.41 84.10
!!!!!Poland 2.59
!!!!!Romania 80.36 0.14 1.40 840.41 814.75
!!!!!Slovakia 849.88 817.46 80.05 0.25 828.42 836.11
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Figure	  1.	  Selected	  Immigration	  Rates,	  
2003-­‐2013	  





















Figure	  2.	  Composition	  of	  NEU-­‐10	  
Immigration	  Flows	  
GIPSI	   A-­‐12	   NEU-­‐10	  (Returning)	   EU-­‐27	   TCN	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Figure	  3.	  Percent	  Change	  in	  Immigration	  
Rates	  by	  Percent	  Change	  in	  
Unemployment	  Rate,	  Select	  Countries	  








DE	   LU	   BE	   AT	   FI	   SE	   UK	   IT	   NE	   ES	   DK	  
Figure	  4.	  Percent	  Change	  in	  
Naturalization	  Rates	  by	  Percent	  Change	  
in	  Unemployment	  Rate,	  Select	  Countries	  
EU-­‐27	   TCN	   A12	   GIPSI	  
	  	  
	  
DV:$Natrate.Total 1 2 3 4 5 6
Migrate$Total 5.9 3.02 1.29 3.65 5.67 10.47**
(4.93) (4.32) (4.33) (4.31) (4.94) (3.9)
ICCI .0.34*** .0.42*** .0.41*** .0.42*** .0.33*** .0.36***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Country$Unemployment .0.23*** .0.29***
(0.04) (0.04)








Constant 4.89*** 7.3*** 8.91*** 5.21*** 4.82*** 6.33***
(0.84) (0.79) (0.98) (0.73) (0.87) (0.63)
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
R2 0.2358 0.3404 0.3651 0.3429 0.2486 0.5584
















DV:$GIPSI$Nat$Rate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GIPSI$Inflows !0.000004** !0.00001** !0.000005** !0.000004** !0.000004** !0.000002* 0.00000** !0.00000* !0.000002*
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percent$Foreign$Population !0.1 !0.05 0.01 !0.08 !0.10 !0.3 !0.32 !0.19 !0.44



















ICCI !0.15*** !0.15*** !0.15*** !0.15*** !0.15*** !0.17*** !0.17*** !0.17*** !0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.87*** 1.64*** 1.60*** 1.90*** 1.64*** 2.37*** 1.89*** 1.86*** 2.25***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.43) (0.17) (0.1) (0.1) (0.14)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
R2 0.4371 0.4537 0.4546 0.4416 0.4382 0.5137 0.5011 0.5083 0.5426






















	   	  
DV:$A12$Nat$Rate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A12$Inflows !0.000005* !0.000004 !0.000004 !0.000002 !0.000004* !0.000002 !0.000004* !0.000001 0.000000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Percent$Foreign$Population !12.17*** !10.95*** !12.45*** !9.79*** !10.31*** !5.21*** !8.29*** !9.81*** !6.40***



















ICCI !0.32*** !0.31*** !0.31*** !0.40*** !0.38*** !0.37*** !0.37*** !0.41*** !0.38***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 6.01*** 2.70* 3.51** 5.60*** 7.22*** 7.83*** 7.10*** 6.18*** 6.29***
(0.64) (1.18) (1.13) (0.56) (0.97) (0.84) (0.97) (0.74) (0.7)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.4042 0.4515 0.4364 0.4748 0.4355 0.5114 0.4461 0.4707 0.488
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